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Abstract 
An interesting feature of some sets of representations is that their structure mirrors the 
structure of the items they represent. Founding an account of representational content 
on isomorphism, homomorphism or structural resemblance has proven elusive, 
however, largely because these relations are too liberal when the candidate structure 
over representational vehicles is unconstrained. Furthermore, in many cases where 
there is a clear isomorphism, it is not relied on in the way the representations are used. 
That points to a potential resolution: that an isomorphism must be used, hence usable, 
if it is to be an ingredient in a theory of content. This paper argues that the class of 
exploitable isomorphisms can indeed play a content-constituting role. 
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I Introduction 
A cartographic map has a spatial structure that mirrors the spatial structure of the 
locations it represents. That fact seems important to the way that the map functions as 
a representation. When we trace out alternative routes between two points on a map 
and select the shortest, we rely on the fact that the shortest distance on paper 
corresponds to the shortest distance on the ground. Generalising away from the 
special case where spatial relations correspond to spatial relations (first order 
resemblance), any relation over a set of representations could in principle correspond 
to a relation over the set of things represented. When the relation over the 
representations not just corresponds to but also represents a relation over the entities 
represented, we have a case of structural representation (Ramsey 2007, pp. 77-92; 
Shagrir 2012; Swoyer 1991). 
 
Structural representation 
A collection of representations in which a relation between representational 
vehicles represents a relation between the entities they represent. 
 
Cartographic maps are structural representations because spatial relations on a 
map represent spatial relations on the ground. However maps are artefacts. Their 
intentionality may depend on us, their users. Are there structural representations 
whose representational properties do not depend on an intelligent interpreter? This 
paper argues that there are. It also addresses a further question. There has been 
considerable controversy over whether an isomorphism or second order resemblance 
between a set of putative representations and a domain of objects could give rise to or 
be the basis of representational content (Cummins 1989; Gallistel 1990; Godfrey-
Smith 1996, pp. 184-87; Millikan 1984, p. 107; Millikan 2013; O’Brien and Opie 
2004; Ramsey 2007). This paper offers a positive answer. I argue that, in some cases, 
the existence of a correspondence between a relation over a set of putative 
representations and a relation over the items represented can be part of what makes it 
the case that the representations have the content they do. 
An obstacle to relying on isomorphism and related notions in a theory of 
content is the liberality of the isomorphisms that exist between two sets of equal size 
(Millikan 2000; Neander forthcoming, ch. 10; Shea 2013; Suárez 2010). A structure-
preserving isomorphism is just a 1-1 map in which a structure on the elements in the 
domain corresponds to a structure on the elements onto which they map. Consider a 
collection of entities to be represented yi and a relation R’ over them. Any set of 
putative representations of the same cardinality will map onto the yi 1-1, and will do 
so in many ways. For each mapping there is a relation over the putative 
representations that corresponds to R’. The existence of an isomorphism is thus a very 
undemanding constraint. Although some embrace this liberality (Cummins 1989), a 
more satisfying answer would cut down the class of candidate admissible 
isomorphisms that a theory of content can appeal to. 
When the candidate relations on both sides of the isomorphism are specified, 
for example that spatial relations between representations should correspond to spatial 
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representations between represented locations, then the existence of an isomorphism 
is an extremely demanding constraint. Even the most accurate map does not satisfy 
this requirement, since there are always slight inaccuracies (for example due to 
projecting a curved world onto a flat sheet). So spatial relations on maps are simply 
not isomorphic in the mathematical sense to spatial relations on the ground. 
Representation can at most require an isomorphism that holds approximately. 
However, the move to approximate isomorphism compounds the liberality problem. 
The bare existence of an approximate correspondence between some structure over 
putative representations and another structure over a domain of entities they might 
represent is an extremely undemanding constraint. 
This paper identifies another, less-appreciated problem. In many cases where 
there is an isomorphism between representations and representeds, the isomorphism 
has no significance for the organism or system making use of the representations. It is 
not relied upon by the system. It enters into no computations, nor does it form part of 
an account of how the system manages to represent correctly when it does. According 
to one influential idea, many kinds of representational content depend in part on there 
being an exploitable relation between representations and the things they represent, a 
relation that is made use of when the system relies on those representations in 
generating behaviour (Godfrey-Smith 2006). (Others, too, make appeals to the way 
representations are interpreted or used in order to home in on the operative 
isomorphism: Cummins 1996; Gallistel 1990, p. 28; Suárez 2003, 2010). In many 
cases, even when there is a reasonably natural isomorphism between a set of 
representations and the things they represent, that relation is not being exploited at all 
in the way the system makes use of the representations. 
Only a very restricted class of isomorphisms are candidates for being 
exploited in this way. A restriction to such exploitable isomorphisms cuts down 
dramatically on the liberality of the isomorphism concept, making it a plausible 
ingredient in a theory of content for some kinds of representational system. This paper 
uses some stylised examples to illustrate the contrast between exploited and 
unexploited isomorphisms, and argues that the class of exploitable isomorphisms can 
play a substantive role in a theory of content. 
Section 2 uses rat navigation as a case study to illustrate the contrast between 
exploited and unexploited isomorphisms and goes on to argue that the salient 
isomorphism in the well-known honeybee nectar dance is not in fact exploited. 
Section 3 uses the case of cartographic maps to show that the requirement that an 
isomorphism be exploited is not unreasonably strong. Section 4 delineates the class of 
exploitable isomorphisms more precisely and argues that they are a plausible 
ingredient in a theory of content for some kinds of system. Section 5 asks whether 
making use of an exploitable isomorphism is just making use of a source of 
correlational information, and section 6 briefly examines some ways in which the 
isomorphism requirement needs to be relaxed if it is to be relied on in theories of 
content for real natural systems. 
I first set aside some related issues that would distract from the main focus. 
Our topic is not whether there can be analogue representations (Goodman 1976; 
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Lewis 1971). Structural representation of the kind considered here could be digital in 
the sense of not admitting of continuous values; nor do I discuss Fodor’s “picture 
principle” – that parts represent parts (Fodor 2007). The structural representations 
considered here are not constrained to be ‘informationally rich’ (Braddon-Mitchell 
and Jackson 2007, pp. 179-80), in the sense that they can give some information only 
by giving a lot of information (in the way that cartographic maps do). Nor will I delve 
into the mental imagery debate (Block 1983). I also set aside linguistic representations 
and the question of whether the subject-predicate structure of language mirrors 
something in the world. 
 
II Case study 
To illustrate the contrast between exploited and unexploited isomorphisms, I use an 
idealised example based on the way spatial navigation works in rats. Place cells in the 
rat hippocampus fire when and only when the rat is in a particular location within a 
spatial domain (O'Keefe and Burgess 2005; O'Keefe and Nadel 1978). Cell A might 
fire when the rat is in one corner of an enclosed arena, cell B when it is two thirds of 
the way down another side. To simplify considerably, suppose these cells were driven 
only by perceived features, independent of the rat’s orientation or direction of motion: 
by the sights and smells observed from a given location. The rat could learn by 
instrumental conditioning what to do at each location – to press a lever when in one 
corner and to pull a chain when two thirds of the way down another side – by 
associating motor programs with place cell firing. When the rat reached a location, 
firing of the corresponding place cell would then trigger appropriate behaviour. That 
mechanism depends on place cell firing correlating reliably with location, but not on 
any relations between different place cells, nor on spatial relations between locations. 
 Since the rat follows continuous routes through its arena, place cells that 
correlate with nearby locations will tend to fire one after the other, and so could 
become associated through classical conditioning. There would then be a co-
activation structure over the place cells. The firing of one place cell would potentiate 
the firing of place cells which correlate with nearby locations. Although the spatial 
organisation of place cells within the hippocampus has no spatial significance (they 
do not form a ‘topographic map’ as some cells in visual cortex do), there is evidence 
that place cells have a co-activation structure that corresponds to the proximity of 
their preferred locations (Dragoi and Tonegawa 2013). However, in our simplified 
example that isomorphism is not being used to guide behaviour. The rat is relying on 
the correlation between each individual place cell and a particular location, but the co-
activation structure over the place cells has no significance for it. It is a case of 
unexploited isomorphism. 
 A necessary condition for an isomorphism to be exploited is that relations 
between putative representations should make a difference to downstream 
computations or behaviour. An exploited isomorphism is one where such a relation is 
made use of in virtue of its correspondence to a relation between the entities 
represented. An adequate characterisation of ‘use in virtue of correspondence’ would 
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require a full theory of content, but the necessary condition is enough for present 
purposes. 
 To see how this necessary condition could be met, let’s enrich the case in line 
with further empirical results. Place cell activity also occurs ‘offline’, that is based on 
the endogenous dynamics of hippocampal neurons when decoupled from perceptual 
input, for example when the rat is asleep (Dragoi and Tonegawa 2011, 2013). There is 
evidence that this happens when a rat is faced with a choice of where to go: before the 
rat sets off, place cells fire offline in sequences that correspond to continuous paths 
through spatial locations. Now suppose, much more speculatively, that offline place 
cell firing were to precess through two or more sequences before the rat sets off, each 
ending at the same final place cell associated with reward. Suppose further that there 
is a system which somehow keeps track of how long it took for each of the offline 
chains of firing to reach the final reward-associated place cell. 
If the rat has a disposition to pick a route that corresponds to the quickest 
chain of place cell firing, that disposition would cause the rat to follow the shorter 
route to the rewarded location. This ability to choose the shorter route does depend on 
the fact that a relation over the place cells (co-activation) corresponds to a relation 
over the locations with which they correlate (spatial proximity). The relation between 
place cell firing acts as input to a computational process of choosing the shorter chain, 
whose utility lies in the fact that co-activation relations over the place cells 
correspond to spatial relations over locations. So in this case the correspondence 
between co-activation structure and spatial structure is being exploited. It is also a 
plausible case of structural representation. 
 
III Unexploited Isomorphism 
In many cases where there is a salient isomorphism, the correspondence is not in fact 
exploited. One of Millikan’s central examples is the honeybee nectar dance, in which 
there is a very obvious isomorphism between dances and locations (Millikan 1984). 
The angular separation between two dances corresponds to the angular separation 
between two nectar sources; and differences in the number of waggles performed 
correspond to spatial distances between nectar sources. In fact, neither of these 
isomorphisms is plausibly a case of structural representation. 
For simplicity, consider only one of these: the correspondence between 
distance of nectar and number of waggles. More waggles corresponds to closer nectar 
locations, so let us suppose that incoming bees produce dances, based on the distance 
they have travelled returning home from a nectar source, according to the simple 
formula waggles = 300m/distance (rounded to the nearest whole number). 
‘Consumer’ bees observing these dances evolved a disposition to fly off a 
corresponding distance when foraging. That pattern of behaviour is useful because 
each individual dance type correlates with a particular distance of nectar (e.g. 5 
waggles correlates with nectar at 60m). 
Had there just been one dance of three waggles for nectar approximately 100m 
away, a disposition to fly off 100m on observing such a dance would still have been 
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evolutionarily advantageous. Perhaps incoming bees could have produced dances 
according to a different system, with more waggles corresponding to more distant 
nectar: waggles = distance/50m, say. Then if consumer bees had evolved a disposition 
to fly off a distance corresponding to the number of observed waggles times 50m, that 
would have been evolutionarily beneficial. 
Indeed, even a more ‘gruesome’ mapping from dances to distances would still 
be useful, provided consumer bees evolved a corresponding disposition to behaviour, 
for example flying off 300m for 1 waggle, 60m for 2 waggles, 150m for 3 waggles, 
75m for 4 waggles, and so on. Such a system is unlikely to evolve in natural systems, 
but if there were such a system, with incoming bees’ dispositions to produce dances 
matching consumer bees’ dispositions to fly off for different distances, then a 
teleosemantic theory of content would deliver corresponding correctness conditions 
for each of the dances. In this case too there is a relation on the dances that 
corresponds to spatial relations between locations (Shea 2013), although it is not a 
natural relation between the representational vehicles (dances). In this case, although 
there is a correspondence between a relation on the dances and a relation on the 
locations, no use is being made of it. 
But surely the real case is different, because there a natural relation on the 
dances (more waggles) corresponds to a natural relation on locations of nectar (closer 
distance)? This is indeed an important difference, but it is still not a case of structural 
representation. In the real case the mapping from representations to represented 
locations is a simple function from natural properties to natural properties: location = 
300m/ number of waggles. As a result, it is relatively straightforward for a single 
mechanism to achieve the needed mapping, both on the input side and the output side. 
I have argued elsewhere that whether a representational system is arbitrary is a matter 
of degree, based on the ease with which the needed mapping from content to 
representation to appropriate behaviour can be achieved by the type of system in 
question (Shea 2011, p. 186). By that criterion, the actual bee dance system is 
relatively un-arbitrary, whereas the gruesome mapping suggested above is more 
arbitrary. That is one significant difference. 
Another difference is that, because a single mechanism has evolved to deal 
with a range of different dances, the mechanism has a relational evolutionary 
function: to fly off a distance given by the formula 300m / number of waggles. The 
evolutionary function of a particular type of dance derives from that relational 
evolutionary function, e.g. the function of the consumer in response to a 2 waggle 
dance is to fly off 150m. Now suppose that for some reason a 4 waggle dance has 
never been performed in the history of the bees. If an occasion arises to perform it, 
then the bees have a mechanism that can cope: producer bees dancing 4 waggles when 
nectar is at 75m and consumer bees flying off 75m when they observe 4 waggles. 
That new dance type still has an evolutionary function, deriving from the overall 
relational function of the mechanism. When there is nectar at 75m for the first time 
and the bees forage for it successfully, that is not by chance. It is because they have a 
mechanism that makes use of a simple function from natural properties of the 
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representations (waggles) to natural properties of the locations represented 
(distances). That is an important feature of the case. 
However, this is not yet a case where a relation between representations is 
being used to represent a relation between the items represented. At no stage are two 
different dances compared or the relation between them computed. The fact that the 4 
waggle dance is 2 waggles more than the 2 waggle dance is not being computed nor 
being used to guide behaviour in any other way. That is most obvious in our 
hypothetical example with the gruesome mapping. In that case the correlation 
between individual dance types and distances was being made use of, but the 
gruesome relation between dances obviously was not. The real system is just the same 
in this respect. The non-arbitrariness of the mapping makes it easier to evolve and 
develop a mechanism that responds appropriately to a range of dances, but that 
mechanism does not depend on comparing different dances and using the relation as a 
proxy for spatial separation between two sources of nectar. The isomorphism between 
dances and locations is not exploited in the synchronic control of behaviour. 
Recall that, to be a structural representation, a relation between two or more 
representations must represent a relation between the entities represented. With the 
bee dance, no relation between dances is acting as input to subsequent computations 
or is conditioning the consumer bees’ behaviour. Nor does an explanation of the 
success of the bees’ behaviour depend on their being able to represent the relations 
between two different sources of nectar (at least in the aspects of bee navigation 
described above). So it is unlikely that relations between locations are being 
represented. If so, this is not a case of structural representation. 
 
IV Application to Cartographic Maps 
Cartographic maps are another case where an isomorphism is being exploited. 
Furthermore, they illustrate the possibility that the relations between putative 
representations are in a sense prior, in that they play a role in fixing the content of the 
so-related representations. Maps are of course a special case, in that they rely on first 
order resemblance. Nevertheless, they provide a good illustration of the more general 
point. 
A map need not have a co-ordinate grid, scale bar or north arrow. Consider an 
array of three points on a page, labelled London, Oxford and York. Two points are not 
enough, but with three points the map can represent relative spatial relations between 
the cities, e.g. that York is three times as far from London as Oxford is, and in such-
and-such relative direction. The relations between points are essential to the 
individual points being involved in any truth-evaluable content at all, but still the 
points represent entities and the relations between them on the map represent spatial 
relations between cities on the ground. 
Consider a map where we replace the singular terms with generic symbols, say 
for churches, pubs and schools. The map makes claims about relations between 
property instances, e.g. that there is a school twice as far from a church as a pub. 
Which pub, church and school are represented by the points depends in part on the 
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relations between the points on the map. It may also depend on facts about the map as 
a whole, for example what it is being used for or how it was produced. However, the 
relations are playing a role, too, such that were the relations between the church, pub 
and school symbols on the map different, they could represent different entities in the 
world. The same applies for other generic symbols, like coloured lines for roads and 
rivers and coloured shading for forests. Unlike a point labelled ‘London’, the relations 
between these generic symbols on the map are playing a role in determining which 
entities are picked out. The idea of structural representation does not require that the 
content of the related representations is prior to the content carried by the relations 
between them. 
There are important issues about exactly how maps represent and precisely 
which kinds of correctness conditions should be associated with different kinds of 
maps (Blumson 2012; Camp 2007; Rescorla 2009a, b). Without committing to any 
detailed claims about the right way of characterising content, nor about the 
compositional semantics that underpins content, I just rely on the claim that relations 
between points represent relations between represented entities, however these other 
issues turn out. I also remain neutral on the representational significance of absence: 
whether the absence of a symbol at a point on a map represents that no entity of the 
kind represented elsewhere on the map (e.g. city, church, forest) is present at that 
location. Cartographic maps are paradigmatic structural representations. The obvious 
isomorphism between space and space is readily exploitable, for example to work out 
which route to follow. When the exploitable correspondence is relied upon, it is an 
exploited isomorphism. 
 
V Exploitable Isomorphisms 
Having defined a structural representation as one in which relations between 
representations represent relations between the entities they represent, I argued that 
there are real cases of structural representation. Furthermore, there can be structural 
representations that do not depend on an intelligent interpreter for their content. 
However, a relation between representations is unlikely to represent unless the system 
is sensitive to it and uses it in a way that makes a computational and/or behavioural 
difference – unless it is exploited. Applying that test, some cases where a 
correspondence between representations and representeds is salient turn out not to be 
ones where the relation between representations is used, and so are unlikely to be 
structural representations. In this section I argue that these considerations can be 
turned into a plausible constraint on the admissible class of isomorphisms that are 
candidates to figure in a theory of content, thus cutting down considerably on the 
problematic liberality of the isomorphism concept. 
There are two sides of the isomorphism to consider, representations and 
representeds. On one side, relations between representations need to usable by the 
system. We intelligent human interpreters can in principle learn any relation over 
representations, for example the relation of successor in the counting sequence of 
number words, which corresponds to no natural relation between the words (phonetic 
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entities) or numerals (inscriptions). Without an intelligent interpreter and within 
simpler systems, a relation between representational vehicles has to be more natural if 
it is to have behavioural or computational significance. It has to be a relation that the 
organism can make use of in downstream processing. Whether that is so will be 
relative to the processing resources of the system. In the brain, relations between the 
pattern and precise timing of the depolarization of neurons can be made use of, 
similarity in the colours of the neural cell bodies cannot. 
Gallistel (1990) argues that which relations between representations are 
relevant is fixed relative to an interpreter and its ‘interpretative code’. However, for 
our purposes it is no good to allow the ‘code’ used by the interpreter entirely to 
determine the relations on representations that are admissible, because then we are 
back to the possibility that any relation over representations, no matter how arbitrary, 
could in principle be the subject of an isomorphism – leading us back to the liberality 
problem.  If the isomorphism is to count as a relation that downstream processes can 
exploit, then it should, in a substantial sense, pre-exist the use made of it, and not 
depend entirely on an interpreter that has just the right ‘code’ so as to react to 
relations between representations in just the right way. If a structure over 
representations is arbitrary and gruesome, then a mathematical isomorphism between 
such a relation and some structure in the world would not be a useful exploitable 
resource. 
On the other hand, some natural relations between representations can readily 
act as input to downstream computations. Relations like the difference in firing rate 
between two neurons is readily the subject of downstream computations. Arranging 
neuronal receptivity such that differences in firing rate correspond to some natural 
relation of interest or, in the example above, so that co-activation structure 
corresponds to spatial proximity, is a very considerable computational achievement. 
In the same way, producing a sheet of paper on which spatial relations between marks 
on the paper correspond to spatial relations between the towns, mountains, rivers etc. 
of a country is a major task. That is why the survey of India was such a notable 
achievement. The pebbles in Horseguards Parade were already isomorphic to the 
geography of India, but that isomorphism is completely useless because no one has 
the appropriate ‘interpretative code’. The cartographers’ achievement is precisely to 
set up an isomorphism where the relation over representations is usable, projectable 
and relatively uniform. 
It is not straightforward to specify which relations between putative 
representational vehicles are detectable, computationally tractable, projectable and 
hence usable, since this raises general issues about the naturalness of properties and 
the projectability of predicates. However, the distinction appealed to here is not a 
special resource needed just by theories of content. Relying on it, only projectable 
relations between putative representations are candidates for an exploitable 
isomorphism. One rough and ready test of whether the relation is pre-existing, or 
whether it is entirely established by the interpreter, is to ask whether it would extend 
to new cases without the interpreter having to learn afresh what to do in respect of 
them. 
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Furthermore, many projectable relations are unexploitable because 
downstream processes cannot be sensitive to them, as in the example of the colour of 
neurons. Neural processes are obviously not suited to making colour comparisons 
between upstream cell bodies. Exploitability in this sense is a matter of degree, 
depending on how difficult it is for computational processes to adapt so as to be 
sensitive to a feature of the representations. Another important matter of degree is the 
question of how widespread the relation is. If a projectable relation that obtains 
between a few representations corresponds to a relevant relation between entities 
represented, that could in principle be made use of; but a correspondence that extends 
uniformly across a whole range of possible representations will be much more useful 
(as with the co-activation relation discussed above, which extends across a large array 
of place cells). 
Turning now to the other side of the isomorphism, there are also constraints on 
the entities and relations in the world to which putative representations are mapped 
under the isomorphism. Most importantly, they must be objects, properties and 
relations that are of some significance to the organism. Furthermore, in the kinds of 
lower level cases we are considering here, arbitrary or gruesome relations between 
representeds are unlikely to be significant to the organism. So the class of exploitable 
isomorphisms can be delineated as follows: 
 
 
Exploitable Isomorphism 
 
(i) A 1-1 map between a set of putative representational vehicles in an 
organism or other system, and a set of entities to be represented, 
 
(ii) in which a projectable relation on the vehicles to which operations of the 
system could be sensitive 
 
(iii) corresponds to1 
 
(iv) a relation, of significance to the system, on the entities to be represented. 
 
 
There is not scope here to offer a full theory of content based on exploitable 
isomorphisms. Clearly the bare existence of an exploitable isomorphism is not enough 
on its own to give rise to correctness conditions and/or satisfaction conditions. In 
some kinds of system it might plausibly be combined with natural teleology to give 
                                                       
1  Relation R on vehicles vi corresponds to relation R’ on entities xi under the 1-1 map I 
in which I(vi)=xi 
 iff 
 ∀i,j{R(vi,vj) ↔ R’(xi,xj)} 
 (Mutatis mutandis for other polyadicities.) 
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rise to correctness conditions.2 However, the idea that representation depends in part 
on use being made of an exploitable relation between representations and the world 
extends beyond teleosemantics. My claim is that exploitable isomorphisms are one 
such relation. As well as the way they are used, the way a system of representations is 
produced may play a role in determining which exploitable relation gets to count as 
the content.  The claim here is that exploitable isomorphisms are suited to being partly 
constitutive of content in a way that the more general class of isomorphisms is not. 
Are structural representations, as we have defined the term, the only place 
where exploitable isomorphisms play a content-constituting role? Recall that the 
structure that does the representing has to consist of a set of relations over 
representational vehicles. So some of the proper parts of the structure that does the 
representing must themselves be representation (although their content need not be 
prior to the relations which relate them, as we saw in relation to maps above). 
Representations in general can of course have structure without their parts being 
representations. The letter ‘A’ has a structure but many of its proper parts are not 
representations at all. Computer icons are another possible case, like the icon that 
represents the instruction ‘print’; although here the structure probably has 
representational significance for the computer user, since it is structure that makes the 
icon look like a printer. Nevertheless, perhaps there are representational vehicles that 
have structure, where the whole has representational content and none of the proper 
parts are representations. They would not then count as structural representations. 
Could it be that isomorphism or structural correspondence plays a role in fixing the 
content of representations of this kind? Nothing I have said rules out such cases, 
although the considerations I pointed to about exploitability make them unlikely. If 
relations between parts of a representation are to act as input to downstream 
computations, or are to be the basis for conditioning behaviour, then it seems likely 
that the so-related parts would thereby be constituted as having some kind of 
representational content. Whether that is so in general is an issue I leave aside here. 
 
VI Exploiting Isomorphisms Contrasted With Exploiting Correlations 
Another kind of exploitable relation is correlation. The simplest kinds of exploitable 
correlations concern variable matters of fact. There is range of tokens Ri and variable 
set of condition in the world Ci, such that when one of the Ri is tokened it changes 
(say raises) the probability that one of more of the conditions Ci obtains. In our 
recurring example, the availability of nectar differs over time and a particular dance 
raises the probability that there is nectar available now at a particular location. 
The structure of a cognitive map can also correlate in this way if it changes 
over time in step with changes to the structure of the environment. When place cell A 
tends to activate place cell B, that raises the probability that their preferred locations 
                                                       
2  In (Shea 2007) I argued that correlational information can be combined with 
evolutionary functions to form the basis of correctness conditions for some simple 
representational systems. 
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are nearby in physical space. If the spatial relations change over time then so 
gradually will the co-activation structure. Even when the physical environment is 
static for the whole life of the organism, there is a sense in which the relations 
between representations correlate with spatial relations between locations – had the 
environment been different, the relations between representations would have been 
different (provided some mechanism of plasticity is involved in establishing the 
exploitable isomorphism). Against a background of possible physical spaces and 
possible representational structures, the actual representational structure is 
probability-raising. 
So are exploitable isomorphisms nothing more than exploitable correlations?  
One question is whether in all exploitable isomorphisms the relation between 
representations carries correlational information about the entities represented. I want 
to leave that issue to one side, since it is clear that there are many cases where 
exploitable isomorphisms do carry correlational information of a relevant kind. My 
claim is that exploitable isomorphisms form a special class that is worth recognising, 
even when they also carry correlational information. 
One reason is that the relation between representations can then be used not 
just to represent an undifferentiated state of affairs (with which it correlates), but to 
represent a relation between the entities represented by its relata. Another is that the 
relation between representations can have a common significance across a very wide 
range of representations. Adding an extra symbol to a map of n existing symbols 
immediately adds at least n claims about relations to places already represented on the 
map (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 2007, pp. 179-80). The same is true when adding 
a new place cell into a co-activation structure. The common significance of the 
relation across a whole array of representations facilitates computation, for example 
calculating a shortest route. None of that follows from having a series of sources of 
correlational information about related matters of fact. A related point is that a 
relation between representations can be used to calculate offline, as described in the 
shortest route example, and so can be used in a very basic form of conditional 
reasoning. So to the extent that exploitable isomorphisms are instances of 
correlational information, they are cases of a very special kind, and so can do 
significant additional work. Their existence could then plausibly be an ingredient in 
content-determination, either instead of or in addition to the role of correlational 
information. The following examples illustrate the differences. 
Desert ants of the genus Cataglyphis reliably exhibit the remarkable ability to 
perform path integration (Wehner, Michel and Antonsen 1996). After foraging for a 
period following a tortuous, criss-crossing route, when the ant finds food it is able to 
follow a ‘beeline’ to its home burrow: it sets off in the right direction and follows a 
straight line for the right distance before beginning a search for local cues to the 
burrow entrance. This ability depends on ‘dead reckoning’ – integrating information 
about speed and direction of movement – and does not depend on using landmarks, 
since an ant translocated to a new location makes a beeline to the location where its 
burrow would be had it too been translocated. 
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Stylising the example for simplicity, suppose the ant can use the polarisation 
of sunlight to detect its current orientation in relation to the sun, with one set of cells 
firing maximally when facing the sun and dropping off to a background tonic level of 
firing when at 90O and reducing further to a minimum when at 180O to it; and another 
set firing maximally when perpendicular, with the sun on the right hand side, passing 
through tonic firing when facing directly towards or away from the sun, and dropping 
off to a minimum when perpendicular to the sun on the left. Suppose further that 
activity from these two sets of cells is fed into a set of four accumulators, gated by 
haptic input from the feet. One accumulator takes the activity of the ‘facing the sun’ 
cell above its tonic rate, times the current level of haptic activity, and adds that up. 
The other three do the same for the three other primary directions. Then each 
accumulator will correlate with the ant’s total net displacement along one each of four 
perpendicular axes. 
So far we only have correlations, but there is also a relation over the 
accumulators that is very relevant to the ant’s needs. To set off in the right direction 
for home the ant just needs to orient itself so that the current input is the inverse of the 
relative levels of the accumulators.3 To make a straight line for home it just needs to 
travel in that direction until its accumulators run down to zero, and then stop and 
make a local search for its burrow. That (hypothetical) mechanism makes use of a 
relation between internal vehicles: a ratio of differences. The relation is made use of 
because it correlates with a fact of significance to the ant, the direction of its home 
burrow. However, the relation is being used just for the correlational information it 
carries. It is not being used because of its significance in relation to two entities being 
represented. This is not a case where a relation between representations is used to 
represent a relation between entities represented. So it is not a case of structural 
representation. 
There are many cases where two sources of information are combined to 
produce a more reliable correlation or a stronger correlation with some further 
condition (Ernst and Banks 2002). That is a ubiquitous feature of hierarchical 
information processing in the brain. The new correlate is based on a relation between 
two existing information-carriers, which in many cases are themselves 
representations. So a relation between representational vehicles is being used. In some 
cases, as with the desert ant example, it will be used simply for the correlational 
information it carries. In others it may represent a relation between the entities 
represented. For example, in visually tracking a small array of objects the visual 
system registers the egocentric spatial position of each of them (Pylyshyn 1989). 
Relations between these registers (“FINSTs”) could be used to keep track of the 
spatial separation between the represented objects, so as to form our expectations 
about when they will collide (Spelke and Van de Walle 1993). That would be to use a 
                                                       
3  More precisely, the ratio of the firing rate of parallel cells to perpendicular cells needs 
to equal the ratio of {180O  accumulators minus 0O accumulators} to {270O 
accumulators minus 90O accumulators}. 
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relation between representations to represent a relation between the entities 
represented – the array of FINSTs would then be a structural representation. 
Another empirical example is analysed by Shagrir (2012). Fixation and 
horizontal saccades of the eyes are plausibly underpinned by a recurrent neural 
network with a single line attractor whose points correspond to eye positions. Shagrir 
argues that motor neurons program a saccade between the current position and a 
target position by taking as input the distance in activation space between the points 
corresponding to the current position and the target position (2012, p. 14). That would 
be to make use of the correspondence between distance in activation state space and 
spatial position of the eyes. So it would be another case of structural representation. 
(By contrast, some of the other computations mentioned by Shagrir do not depend on 
exploiting structural correspondence.) 
 In all of the cases above where an isomorphism is actually being exploited, the 
relation between representational vehicles also carries correlational information about 
the relation which it is used to represent. However, being used to represent a relation 
between represented entities is something over and above simply being used for the 
correlational information that the relation carries. 
 
VII Beyond Strict Isomorphisms 
Our focus on isomorphisms is a simplification – useful because it highlights the 
central issue about how structure can stand for structure – which would need to be 
relaxed in several ways to be turned into a plausible ingredient in a theory of content 
for many real systems (cp. Shagrir 2012, p. 3). There is only scope here to gesture in 
the direction of these modifications. First, the 1-1 mapping requirement is doubtless 
too strong. In real cases there may be representational redundancy, such that two or 
more different representations in fact represent the same entity, yet still many of the 
relations over the array of representations remain useful. Homomorphism may 
therefore be the more appropriate tool. Another idealization is that the isomorphism 
should hold precisely, as between a natural, computable relation over representations 
and a natural, significant property over representeds. For example, if we required 
spatial relations between points on a map to be genuinely isomorphic to spatial 
relations between locations on the ground, there would be no room for a partially 
accurate map. Even the slightest divergence from exact correspondence would destroy 
the isomorphism. So we need some account of an isomorphism or homomorphism 
holding only approximately. As we saw above, the class of isomorphisms or 
homomorphisms that hold only approximately is extremely wide, so the fact that such 
relations obtain is not, taken alone, a plausible basis for the metaphysics of content. 
 Given a set of represented entities and a represented relation, it is reasonably 
straightforward to calculate the accuracy of the whole array. For each represented 
relation, calculate how closely it matches the actual relation between the entities 
represented. The sum (possibly weighted) of these values over the whole array 
measures the accuracy of the structural representation. 
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 As is the case with correlations (Godfrey-Smith 1989), the array of 
representations may not represent that which would make it maximally accurate. 
Since other resources will be appealed to by any plausible theory of content, in 
addition to exploitable approximate homomorphisms, content need not be fixed so as 
to maximise accuracy. For example, a map of the churches in a city might be more 
accurate if the points were taken to represent pubs (since every church has a pub next 
door but many churches have been converted to other uses since the map was made). 
Nevertheless, facts about how the map is used might constitute it as having church-
related content not pub-related content. 
 The representational significance of the relation between representational 
vehicles is also up for grabs, and affects the accuracy of the structural representation. 
For each potential assignment of content to relations between representations, we can 
calculate how accurate the structural representation would be on that assignment. In 
fact, both the content of the points and the content of the relations can be allowed to 
vary independently, telling us for a given structure how accurate it would be as a 
representation of a whole suite of entities and their potential relations.4 Each of these 
is, to a greater or lesser extent, an exploitable feature of a given fixed structured set of 
representations. 
A structured set of putative representations may have a large number of 
approximate exploitable homomorphisms to natural structures in the environment of 
significance to an organism. We saw in section 4 that structures vary in exploitability 
depending on how available for downstream processing the relations between 
representations are on the one hand, and how natural and significant the relations 
between representeds are on the other. To that we should add variation in how 
accurate they would be as a structural representation given the way the world is. 
Ceteris paribus, structures will be more useful as representations of sets of conditions 
about which they would be more accurate. 
 
VIII Conclusion 
The requirement that a structure over representations be used if it is to have 
representational significance is an important constraint. It follows that, at least in 
simple systems of the kind considered here, only isomorphisms that are exploitable 
are plausible ingredients in a theory of content. This cuts down substantially on the 
otherwise problematic liberality with which isomorphisms subsist between putative 
representations, and entities and relations in the world. It is a considerable 
achievement to arrange things so that a projectable relation to which the system can 
be sensitive over a set of putative representational vehicles corresponds to a 
                                                       
4  Furthermore, downstream processing could be sensitive to the fact that the 
representational significance of a relation varies somewhat for different relations in 
the array, in the way that longitude gets distorted on a Mercator projection of the 
globe. So approximate homomorphisms in which the relation varies over the 
representational space are also to some extent exploitable. 
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significant natural relation on a set of entities relevant to the system. There being such 
a correspondence could, then, be part of what makes it the case that some kinds of 
representation have the content they do. 
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